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ABSTRACT
Generative grammarians typically advocate for a rationalist 
understanding of language acquisition, according to which 
the structure of a developed language faculty reflects innate 
guidance rather than environmental influence. This proposal 
is developed in developmental linguistics by triggering mod-
els of language acquisition. Opposing this tradition, various 
theorists have advocated for empiricist views of language 
acquisition, according to which the structure of 
a developed linguistic competence reflects the linguistic 
environment in which this competence developed. On this 
picture, linguistic development is accounted for by general 
statistical learning mechanisms. In this article I shall precisify 
the debate, provide a clearer picture of what is at stake, and 
show why an intermediate picture is needed.
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1. Rationalism and empiricism
The terms ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’ have been applied to many distinct 
positions. Traditional rationalists1 and empiricists2 adopted clusters of 
views relating epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology, and followers 
of these programs extended them to other areas.3 I will be concerned with 
how this debate plays out in psychology, wherein modern rationalists claim 
that psychological states and capacities are innately determined, whereas 
empiricists claim development is a process of reflecting the environment.
This raises the question: what does it mean for psychological states to be 
innately determined? Like ‘rationalism’ and ‘empiricism’, ‘innate’ has been 
used to draw many non-equivalent distinctions. For this reason, Griffiths 
(2002) argues that we should eschew this concept entirely in favor or more 
specific ones. This strikes me as an over-reaction. As long as we are careful 
to specify exactly how we are using the term, and to interpret other’s 
claims in line with their stipulated usage, the harms of equivocation can be 
avoided. In a series of papers Mameli and Bateson (2011, 2006); Bateson 
and Mameli (2007), have argued similarly that the folk notion of innate-
ness is used to pick out a wide range of different properties, many of which 
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are scientifically uninteresting, and have thus urged that we may be better 
off eschewing this notion entirely, in favor of scientifically better-defined 
notions such as canalization or adaptation. Again, I believe that, as long as 
one is explicit about how the term is being used, these problems can be 
avoided. I am not here attempting to provide an analysis of the term 
‘innate’. I am interested instead using the term to draw a distinction 
between certain classes of models of psychological development, focusing 
on language acquisition.
As I shall use the term, a trait is innate to the extent that an explanation of 
its structure does not require reference to the extraction of information 
from the developmental environment. Crucially, this is not merely a causal 
claim. All developed states are causally dependent on both environmental 
and internal/biological influences, and so drawing this distinction along 
causal lines is a nonstarter.4 Likewise, the claim is not that innate traits 
don’t carry information about the environment. In the mathematical sense 
of ‘information’, any reliable causal dependency will result in the carrying of 
information.5 The motivation for this view is that some traits seem to be 
molded by the environment, reflecting the structure of environmental 
stimuli, whereas others, even though causally dependent on the environ-
ment, develop structures that do not reflect the properties of the environ-
ment. In such cases, the structure of the trait must be internally given. The 
rationalist claims that aspects of the mind are structured by internal forces 
and thus do not, or at least need not, reflect the properties of the environ-
ment. The empiricist, on the other hand, claims that developed psychologies 
are reflective of patterns in the environment to which organisms are 
sensitive.
This proposal is thus intended to be consistent with approaches to 
development which claim to reject a strict distinction between biology and 
environment, such as Developmental Systems Theory (as developed in 
Oyama et al. (2003)). These approaches stress the interdependence between 
organism and environment, undermining the factorization of the explana-
tion of developed traits into those that are “in the genes” and those that are 
acquired. They also stress the ways in which whatever role genetics does play 
is only made possible by substantial scaffolding from non-genetic (both 
organismic and environmental) structures. As I read it, the impetus behind 
such proposals is that the causal relations between organism and environ-
ment are complex and dialectical. I do not deny this, and I am not assuming 
that the traits I describe as ‘innate’ need be specified or determined by the 
organism’s genome.6 What I am stressing is that, even given this causal 
complexity, we are able to distinguish between two kinds of development: 
one which relies on the environment purely causally, and another which 
responds to patterns in this environment by functioning to reproduce these 
patterns within the organism.
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This account also allows for the appropriate, if etymologically puzzling, 
claim that innate traits need not be present at birth. An innate trait can 
develop at any time, as long as the structure of the end product is not 
reflective of any external stimulus.7
It also has the nice result that it makes sense to talk of a trait as being 
more or less innate. A trait is entirely innate if all of its structure is a result 
of internal forces, even if it depends causally on external stimuli. A trait 
can also be entirely non-innate if its structure exactly matches that of an 
environmental pattern to which the organism is sensitive. Traits which 
partially reflect the environment, but deviate from the environmental 
patterns in internally driven ways will count as partially innate. This 
account is thus not subject to the worry that the debate is empty because 
all traits are causally dependent on internal and external factors. 
Rationalists must accept that the environment plays a role, and empiricists 
must accept that minds respond to the environment in specific and 
contingent ways. However, the rationalist claims that the role of the 
environment is limited to influencing which of a limited set of options 
the system will be internally driven to develop, whereas the empiricist 
views the mind as a system for attuning an organism to its environment, 
with development involving coming to more accurately reflect this envir-
onment. The crucial distinction, as will become clear when we look at 
triggering models of language acquisition, is between, on the one hand, the 
environment selecting or enabling the development of a trait, and on the 
other, the environment providing the details for how the trait is supposed 
to be structured.
One final feature of my proposal is that we may wish to adopt a relativized 
or domain-specific notion of innateness, according to which features of 
some model of acquisition may be innate in an unrestricted sense, i.e., 
influence the development of a trait in ways other than (rationally) reflecting 
the environment, but will not be counted as innate from the perspective of 
the developmental task in question. I have in mind here features of devel-
opment which deviate from pure reflection of the environment, but in ways 
which are common throughout developmental systems. For example, it may 
be a general feature of learning that learning mechanisms instantiate certain 
biases, e.g., preferences for relatively regular rules. This would show that 
learning is not purely empiricist, but would not show that there are any 
innate features of traits which are specific to the trait in question. If language 
acquisition depended only on these very general biases, there would be 
a clear sense in which language was not innate. So we can distinguish 
between purely empiricist systems in the widest sense, which incorporate 
no mechanism for deviating from the observations, and purely empiricist 
systems in the narrow sense which incorporate no mechanism for such 
deviations specific to the areas in which they apply. We will look in section 4 
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at a particular acquisition model which should hopefully make these dis-
tinctions clear.
Here is a simple example exemplifying the contrasts between rationalist 
and empiricist positions. Imagine two systems responding to strings of 
letters. One system, the empiricist system E, uses statistical mechanisms to 
abstract patterns from the input string. The other, the rationalist system R, 
instead produces a repeating string of the first letter of the input. Compare 
E and R’s responses to the following input strings:
(1) aaaaaa . . .
(2) ababab . . .
(3) all the king’s horses
For string 1, E and R would produce the same output. R, however, would 
produce exactly the same response to all three input strings, whereas 
E would differentiate string 2 from string 1, accurately reproducing both 
of them. For 3, however, E would either produce something nonsensical or 
nothing at all.8 There are a few things to notice here. Firstly, E is much less 
restricted in its output states. E has as many possible states as there are 
patterns detectable by its algorithm. R however is highly restricted. It can 
produce only 26 representations. Relatedly, while both R and E’s final states 
are caused by their environments, only E’s are reflective of the environment. 
From E’s final state, we can predict E’s environment with a decent degree of 
accuracy. However, for R this is not the case. An output of ‘aaaa . . . .’ is 
consistent between any number of inputs. This is the sense in which non- 
innate traits carry more information about the environment. Likewise, if 
R does resemble the environment, this is, from a developmental perspective, 
an accident: it just so happens that of the many possible environmental 
patterns R could have encountered, it found one of the few it can resemble. 
This is not the case for E. Hopefully the picture of innateness just described 
can be made a little clearer through comparison to some of the other 
standard accounts in the literature, which I shall turn to in the next section.
2. Developing the account
An account close to my own in the literature is the view that innateness 
should be viewed as canalization, as defended by Ariew (1996, 1999) and 
Collins (2005). A trait is canalized to the extent that its properties are 
independent of the variation in the environments in which the trait 
develops.9 Roughly, we can think of canalized traits as those for which 
there is a many-to-one mapping of developmental environments onto traits 
and their properties. For example, the human skeleton, if it is able to develop 
at all, acquires roughly the same structure in whichever environment it 
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arises, and so is highly canalized. On the other hand, what sort of music one 
likes seems to depend greatly on the fine-grained properties of one’s envir-
onment, and so is not canalized. This theory then says that the degree to 
which a trait is innate is the degree to which it is canalized: innate traits 
develop broadly independently of their environments, while non-innate 
traits are highly sensitive to the properties of the environment.
My own account overlaps significantly with the canalization approach. 
Given that a canalized trait, by definition, develops in the same way in many 
different contexts, explanations of the developed structure of such traits are 
unlikely to require much appeal to the environment. If, in a wide range of 
environments, the same trait develops, it is highly likely that the developed 
structure of this trait is explained with reference to internal features of the 
organism. Thus, canalized traits are likely to be counted as innate on my 
theory as well. However, the converse does not hold. Traits which develop 
only in a specific set of environments may nonetheless incorporate intern-
ally driven structure, and so will, to that extent, count as innate on my 
theory. This reflects the fact that certain developmental pathways may 
require very specific environmental stimuli to develop, but these stimuli 
are nonetheless mere causes of such development and do not structure the 
developed trait.
As with the canalization account of innateness, I believe that my proposal 
can incorporate the insights behind primitivist accounts of innateness (see 
e.g., Cowie (1999) and Samuels (2002, 2004) without also adopting their 
pitfalls. Primitivist accounts view a trait as innate if and only if it’s devel-
opment is not a result of psychological processes. This account nicely 
captures the sense in which Fodor (1975, 1981, 1998) views concepts as 
innate: i.e., they are not acquired as a result of learning or some other 
rational process. However, as Collins (2005) points out, this account fails 
to meet an apparent desideratum for a theory of innateness in that it applies 
only to psychological traits. Obviously, we cannot apply this theory to traits 
more generally, as it would lead to non-psychological processes of organis-
mic change, such as getting a tattoo, counting as innate. Of course, it could 
be that there are simply distinct notions of innateness in the cognitive and 
biological sciences, but all things being equal an account of innateness which 
applied to both biological and psychological development would be 
preferable.
I believe Collins’ objection points to a broader issue: there is no reason, in 
principle, to assume that the distinction between non-psychological and 
psychological processes tracks the distinction between processes of reflect-
ing or being structured by the environment and processes which are merely 
caused by the environment. If I am right, the notion of innateness, as 
exemplified in the linguistic disputes I will be discussing, aims to capture 
the latter, rather than the former. Indeed, there is reason to think these 
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distinctions may cross-cut one another. Triggering models of language 
acquisition, to be discussed later, are fully fledged psychological processes: 
they posit the development of a particular system of linguistic rules on the 
basis of representation of linguistic input. But these are nativist theories in 
that the structure of the developed system is guided by, and thus explained 
with reference to, internal properties of the human language faculty, not 
statistical features of the linguistic environment. In the other direction, we 
may view certain developmental processes as functioning to replicate fea-
tures of the environment by way of non-psychological processes. Burge 
(2010) (Chapter 9) presents an extended argument that certain sensory 
systems, especially gustation and olfaction, should not be viewed as genu-
inely perceptual systems, on the grounds that such capacities can be 
explained without the positing of genuine psychological representations. If 
we take representation to be a genuine mark of the mental, then we could 
read this work as denying that such capacities are genuinely psychological. 
But we would not want to infer that all influence of such systems, e.g., on the 
behavior of non-perceptual organisms such as amoebae or worms, or in 
humans prior to their integration with genuinely representational processes 
such as generalization and categorization, is innate. This suggests the pos-
sibility of non-psychological processes of extraction of information from the 
environment, which would count as non-innate on my view, but not that of 
the primitivist. This seems like the right result. Of course, the philosophical 
and empirical premises here are controversial, but it seems that a theory of 
innateness should leave open the possibility of such environment driven, 
but non-psychological, development.
This set of considerations also tells against the proposal in Fodor (2008) 
to replace the innate/acquired distinction with the distinction between states 
acquired brute-causally and those acquired rationally, while again holding 
onto the insight behind this distinction. Rationality is conceptually, I take it, 
a constraint on representational processes. But as we saw above, there seems 
to be no reason in principle to think that the only way for an organism to 
develop so as to reproduce the properties of the environment is by repre-
senting the environment. While rational processes will, I suppose, be pro-
cesses of this sort, “brute causal” processes need not fail to reproduce the 
properties of their causes. But when such brute-causal processes do lead to 
the development of traits which reflect the environment, intuitively these 
traits will not be plausibly viewed as innate.
Margolis and Laurence (2013) argue that the nativism/empiricism debate 
should be conceived of as a debate concerning the number of psychological 
mechanisms: empiricists view all developed (psychological) traits as stem-
ming from the operation of a small number of generally applicable mechan-
isms, while the nativist views these traits as a product of many specialized 
systems. I believe that extensionally my view and that of Margolis and 
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Laurence are fairly similar. But I believe my account is better as a description 
of what is actually at stake. The question is: why should we care so much 
about how many mechanisms must be appealed to in explaining develop-
ment? My account provides an answer: if the development of a trait depends 
on a specialized system, the character of that system is likely to play an 
essential role in the explanation of the structure of the developed trait. On 
the empiricist view, different domains of knowledge (language, mathe-
matics, social reasoning, etc.) are differentiated only by the information 
from which they have been generated: the mechanism for their acquisition is 
the same, general-purpose, learning system. So, in explaining why these 
domains of knowledge are as they are, we will appeal only to these differ-
ences in the input, i.e., the environment. For the nativist/rationalist on the 
other hand, if each of these domains is a product of distinct acquisition 
mechanisms, we will likely have to appeal to these distinct mechanisms in 
accounting for their developed properties. This means that we can replace 
Margolis and Laurence’s initially puzzling claim that the debate is charac-
terized by the issue of how many mechanisms there are, to the claim that the 
number of mechanisms is a characteristic point of disagreement between 
nativists and rationalists, and this disagreement stems from the explanatory 
strategies of these respective approaches.
O’Neill (2015) argues that our notion of innateness should be relativized. 
In particular, she claims that a trait is innate relative to some particular 
environmental attribute when its development is insensitive to variation in 
that attribute. So for example, having a working visual system is innate 
relative to the language spoken in one’s environment, but not relative to 
one’s eyes being sewn shut for the first few months of life (Wiesel and Hubel 
(1963)). While I agree that the innateness of a trait should be relativized, 
I disagree with O’Neill’s approach on the grounds that it retains the pro-
blems of any account of innateness based on the causal role of the environ-
ment. As stated earlier, the problem with this is that all traits are causally 
dependent on the environment in some ways. This is less of a problem for 
O’Neill than for some other views, as it means that every trait will only be 
non-innate relative to some environmental factor, rather than categorically 
non-innate. But this still seems to blur the key distinction between different 
types of developmental process as detailed in this paper. For example, all 
traits will presumably, on O’Neill’s account, be non-innate relative to 
nutrition. If an organism cannot acquire enough energy, it simply won’t 
develop at all. Likewise, all parties to the debate about language acquisition 
agree that some linguistic stimulus is required in order for language to 
develop.10 This dependence on the environment seems crucially different 
from the dependence on the environment appealed to in empiricist theories.
As my account appeals to the explanation of developed traits, it is worth 
touching on some important features of explanation in general which will be 
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important to my account. Firstly, explanations typically discriminate 
between causes. While many things are required to cause some event, only 
some subset of these will be relevant to explaining it. While the spark and 
the oxygen are needed to cause the fire, only the spark (usually) explains it. 
Secondly, explanations are contrastive: one and the same event can receive 
different explanations when contrasted to different sets of alternatives. while 
consumption of alcohol can explain why one got a tattoo, it can’t explain 
why someone got a tattoo of the phrase ‘Mexican Death Star’. For that, we 
need more fine-grained information about the circumstances (see Lipton 
(1990) for classical discussion of both of these points). Both of these points 
will then apply to the classification of a trait as innate. While encountering 
language in the environment may be necessary for the development of 
language, nativists claim that this experience does not (typically) play 
a central role in explaining language acquisition. Just as the presence of 
environmental oxygen is backgrounded in explanations of why the house 
burned down, experience of some language can, according to these theorist, 
be largely backgrounded in explanations of language acquisition. Likewise, 
how we characterize the trait at issue will influence what the appropriate 
explanation will be. That I speak English, rather than Korean, will be 
explained with reference to my being raised in an English-speaking envir-
onment (although whether the structure of English is explained in this way 
is precisely the issue to be discussed later). But that I speak a language with 
a hierarchical syntax will not.
On the face of it, my notion of innateness is susceptible to some of the 
stock counter-examples in the literature. For example, what Damasio 
(1994) calls ‘acquired sociopathy’ (p. 178), anti-social behavioral disor-
ders caused by neurological damage, will count as innate, as the resultant 
states and behavior are not reflective of their environmental cause. 
Clearly, the environmental cause, e.g., a blow to the head, does not here 
provide the structural details of the acquired psychopathology. So, con-
trary to our intuitions, acquired psychopathy will thus be counted as 
innate on my approach.
In such cases, the explanation for why certain kinds of trauma lead to 
these anti-social states will involve primarily an account of the nature of the 
internal processes which lead, in response to this trauma, to the resultant 
state. The mind is, in this respect, unlike a car’s bumper. A physical shock to 
the bumper may create a dent with roughly similar size and shape to the 
object responsible. But, the dynamics of the brain mean that gross physical 
damage leads to significant endogenous restructuring. This restructuring 
can thus have surprising psychological and behavioral effects which do not, 
in any way, reflect properties of the cause of the damage. As these effects are 
quite systematic between agents (James and Blair (2002)), it seems that an 
explanation of them must appeal to predictable internal features of 
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organization and plasticity. To this extent, it seems to not do too much 
damage to our notion of innateness to view this traits as innate.
Note that the counter-intuitiveness of this result can be lessened even 
more by the contrastive nature of explanation, and thus of innateness. If we 
want to explain why someone has acquired sociopathy vs. not acquiring 
sociopathy, that they have received a blow to the head will be of central 
explanatory interest. Thus, that they are sociopathic is not innate: explana-
tions of this trait must appeal to the environment. However, that sociopathy 
has the characteristic behavioral and psychological properties that it does 
will instead contrast this outcome to other possible responses to trauma. If 
we ask why this person became impulsive, aggressive, insensitive to the 
legitimate moral claims of others, etc., rather than, say, becoming placid and 
generous, we can hold the environmental stimulus fixed and explain this 
with reference to internal features of the victim’s brain. To this extent, then, 
(this aspect of) the trait will be innate. The trait will thus be innate in the 
people in which it occurs, as its structure is explained without reference to 
the environment, but the occurrence or not of the trait is not innate. The 
environmental stimulus, the cause of trauma, plays a purely causal role in 
explaining the acquired psychological state.
Likewise, Fodor (1975, p. 32) introduced the thought experiment of 
a “Latin pill” which, when ingested, would grant one the ability to speak 
Latin. As is usual with such sci-fi examples, what they show depends on 
details which are underspecified in their description. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the “mechanism” of such a pill will determine whether the acquisition of 
Latin in this way will count as innate or not. One possibility would be that 
the pill contains, in some microscopic format, all the structure of Latin, and 
somehow this structure is extracted by the brain of the person ingesting the 
pill. This would then be a case, as Fodor intended, of a trait which is neither 
innate nor learned. But it poses no problem for my view, as intuitively in 
such a case we are extracting information from the environment, albeit in 
a surprisingly compressed form, and so would be non-innate as predicted. 
Alternatively, the pill could serve to directly modify features of the mind/ 
brain which are modified in the normal course of acquisition by environ-
mental linguistic data. One possibility here would be that the pill serves as 
a sort of simultaneous trigger to the various parametric linguistic options 
made available to the human mind. In such a case, it seems intuitively 
reasonable to call the acquisition of Latin ‘innate’, as the structure of the 
developed language is again explained with reference to the internal states of 
the mind. In a sense, the subject knew Latin all along, and the pill just served 
to make this knowledge available. The case which is needed, to provide 
a problem for this view, is one in which there is no suitable structure present 
in either the pill or the pre-ingestion mind, but where the pill causes the 
mind to acquire Latin nonetheless. However, such a case seems like either 
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inexplicable random chance or magic. The structure of Latin, with all its 
declensions and conjugations, must come from somewhere! If not, it is far 
from clear that there could ever be a systematic and law-like explanation of 
such a causal link. As what is being proposed is a theory of innateness 
suitable for empirical science, it seems that such examples can be safely 
ignored.
Before moving on to the empirical questions that such an account makes 
possible, it is worth explaining why I do not take it to be essential that innate 
traits are adaptations, as does Lorenz (1966). On the face of it, such 
a condition can help resolve certain puzzles about innateness, on my view, 
including the apparently counter-intuitive results just discussed. As humans 
have (presumably?) not been selected for their ability to become sociopathic 
after taking a blow to the head, this trait would be ruled out by this 
condition. Thus, something like Fodor’s three-way distinction between 
innate, learned, and neither innate nor learned could be recapitulated, 
with the final category (applying to inter alia acquired sociopathy) contain-
ing states which are explained without reference to extraction of informa-
tion about environmental structure but which are not adaptations.11 Despite 
this benefit, I do not want it to be a requirement that innate traits be 
adaptations. For one reason, as Barrett (2014) discusses at length, natural 
selection plays an essential role in explaining both innate and non-innate 
traits. Evolutionary forces have led to organisms with traits with a wide 
variety of norms of reactions, roughly functions from environment and 
genotype to phenotype. Even learned traits are made possible by selection 
for the capacity to learn in these ways. So, being a product of adaptation will 
not distinguish innate from non-innate traits. In the other direction, and 
perhaps more significantly for my purposes, whether our linguistic capa-
cities are adaptations is itself highly controversial. Chomsky has consistently 
argued over the years that we ought be skeptical of adaptationist arguments 
in this domain (dating back at least to Chomsky (1972)), and recent work in 
the Minimalist Program has argued that it may be plausible that much of the 
structure of the language faculty stems not from contingent adaptations but 
instead from so-called ‘third factors’, general constraints on the develop-
ment of complex systems (Chomsky (2005)). This would thus be an innate 
trait which is not adaptive. While this idea is highly controversial in the area 
of language, since the work of Gould and Lewontin (1979) it is uncontro-
versial that some traits will be explained in this manner. So it should not be 
a constraint on innateness that it be adaptive.
I hope to have shown that my account differs, in favorable ways, from 
the variety of options currently available in the literature. My discussion of 
these views has, of course, been quite quick, and has not captured all the 
subtle differences between versions of these various views. But I hope it 
has at least served to further elucidate my account of innateness as absence 
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of extraction of environmental information, and shown what makes it 
plausible.
3. The structure of the arguments
Turning now to the linguistic case, a developmental theory of language aims 
to identify the function from available linguistic data to acquired language 
faculty. We can assume as a starting point that we have access to the input/ 
output patterns: what state the developed linguistic competence12 adopts in 
response to what primary linguistic data. The goal then is to work back-
wards from this mapping to discover the processes at work. Of course, the 
temporal order of linguistic theorizing is not this simple. Linguists do not 
need to wait until the final, correct grammatical theory has been proposed 
before developing theories of acquisition, and often which grammatical 
theory is deemed best will depend on how competing theories interact 
with developmental theories. We can, however, adopt the idealization that 
developmental theories are proposed to explain the accepted input-output 
patterns for the purposes of this paper.
As in the case of our machines, there are characteristic patterns of input/ 
output behavior which provide evidence for the competing positions. 
Patterns supporting rationalism will show:
1 a) Information in output (e.g., developed linguistic competence) not 
found in input (e.g., primary linguistic data).
b) Few possible output states.
c) Low resemblance between input and output.
Empiricist-favoring patterns however will show:
2 a) All information in output found in input.
b) Many possible output states.
c) High resemblance between input and output.
Pattern 1a is the clearest case for rationalism. If there is information in the 
developed system not found in the stimulus, this must have been contrib-
uted by the learner.
Patterns 2b and 2c constitute (less decisive) evidence for empiricism. If 
we observe a high degree of resemblance between the environment and the 
developed states of the learner, this could be a result of a highly structured 
initial state which happens to correlate with the environment in which it 
developed. However, the closer the correlation is, the less parsimonious 
such a proposal will be. This proposal would rely on the claim that sig-
nificant correlation between the organism and the environment is, from an 
ontogenetic perspective, accidental. An empiricist proposal would not need 
to posit some extra mechanism to explain (away) any organism/environ-
ment correlation. This is just what such systems are designed to do, and so 
empiricist accounts are neater when such correlations are observed.
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Note that there are plausible rationalist accounts of why, despite the 
correlation between internal state and external environment, the state 
should be viewed as innate. The most general such account would be an 
evolutionary one. If environmental patterns are highly stable, it is concei-
vable that over evolutionary time the reproduction of these patterns would 
be offloaded from ontogeny to phylogeny.13 That is, if it is adaptive to know 
about certain features of one’s environment, and these features remain the 
same over evolutionary time-scales, organisms with this knowledge innately 
may acquire an adaptive benefit, in that they need not spend resources 
extracting this knowledge from the environment, and so minds containing 
such knowledge may simply develop, rather than needing to learn it each 
generation. In such a case, I would view the reflection of the environment as 
innate.14 To distinguish such a case of innate structure from empiricist, 
acquired structure, we would need to, perhaps counterfactually, see what 
happens when the environment ceases to be reliable. The nativist system 
would continue to develop as it normally does (assuming that the environ-
ment is not so catastrophically different that development is impossible), 
and thus cease to reflect the environment, wheres the empiricist system 
would develop differently, reflecting the novel properties of the new envir-
onment. Much work in Evolutionary Psychology (e.g., Barkow et al. (1995)) 
assumes this sort of picture, including the claim that organisms, especially 
humans, may be in trouble because our innately developing minds are 
structured by an environment that is no longer present. Of course, this is 
not to defend this research, and there are many criticisms of both this 
evolutionary proposal and the developmental processes it presupposes,15 
but it is at least a possibility. This further indicates the complexity of 
inferring from these observations which prima facie suggest empiricist, or 
rationalist, models.
Likewise, pattern 2b is consistent with a rationalist proposal. The initial 
state could be highly complex, allowing for external stimuli to select one of 
a large number of possible resultant states. However, if the structure of the 
system’s final states is fully provided innately, then as the number of possible 
final states increases, so does the burden placed on innate structure. If we 
observe significant variation in the final state, this variation is likely to be 
more economically accounted for by empiricist mechanisms which extract 
this information from the environment.
We can now identify the various positions in debates about linguistic 
innateness. A pure rationalist claims that all the structure of the adult 
competence is provided by internal constraints. This view allows for lan-
guage variation, but only in the sense that different environmental stimuli 
can cause the faculty to develop along different lines. But the stimuli are 
merely causal. The developed faculty need not resemble or reflect the 
properties of this cause in any substantial way. At the other extreme, 
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a pure empiricism will claim that all of human linguistic competence 
reflects, at some level, properties of its linguistic environment. Chater 
et al. (2015) propose, in this vein, that language acquisition can be viewed 
as a process of lossless compression: the aim of the learner is to find the 
maximally compact way of describing the most likely source of the linguistic 
data they encounter.16 For example, if a language contains constraints on 
wh-movement, then such constraints must be evidenced in the input.17
Intermediate positions involve the claims that some language learning is 
rationalist or empiricist. The weak rationalist claims that at least some of the 
structure of the developed language faculty is not provided by the environ-
ment. The weak empiricist claims that at least some of this structure is. Of 
course, unlike the pure positions, these positions are compatible. Indeed, if 
‘some’ is read to mean some but not all, these positions will be mutually 
entailing. If the languages one learns partially reflect innate structures and 
partially reflect one’s linguistic environment, weak versions of both posi-
tions will be vindicated.
As mentioned in section 1, this account allows for a graded notion of 
innateness. This is, I think, a virtue, as many, if not most, traits seem 
partially reflective of the environment, and partially structured by internal 
factors. I shall argue that linguistic competence should be viewed in exactly 
this way, as a mixture of both internal and external factors. In general, this 
notion of innateness should enable us to tease out exactly which aspects of 
a particular learning model are innate and which are not.
It will, I am sure, be clear that many idealizations are being made in this 
description of the goals of developmental linguistics. Most centrally, the 
idealized picture I have presented takes for granted that the inputs to the 
process of language acquisition, the primary linguistic data, and the outputs, 
the developed competences, are known. Of course, much of the debate turns 
precisely on these issues. As a matter of sociological fact, views on the input, 
output, and process cluster together. Rationalists tend to take the input to be 
sparse, the output to be complex, abstract, and categorical, and the process 
to be correspondingly in need of substantive innate guidance. Empiricists 
dispute the poverty of the input (see e.g., Reali and Christiansen (2005)), 
have less abstract understandings of the acquired competence, and thus feel 
less need to posit substantive innate constraints.
For example, one’s view on what shape developed linguistic competence 
takes will motivate different sorts of learning system. Mainstream generati-
vist theories, such as Minimalism (Chomsky (1995)), have mostly viewed 
linguistic rules as categorical: a syntactic construction is either generable by 
the system or it is not.18 This doesn’t rule out a probabilistic acquisition 
process, and indeed both early (Chomsky (1965)) and recent (Yang (2002, 
2016)) work in generative linguistics suggests such a model, but it does open 
the door for a categorical model of learning, as we shall see in discussion of 
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triggering models. On the other hand, if one views our linguistic compe-
tence as itself consisting in probabilistic information (see e.g., Manning 
(2003) and Chater et al. (2015)), specifying not merely which expressions 
can be combined, but how likely such combinations are, then this seems to 
require a model of acquisition which keeps track of statistical patterns in 
encountered language. Relatedly, different views of what is involved in 
knowing a language, i.e., whether it is knowing a grammar as in mainstream 
generative theories, or developing a collection of autonomous linguistic 
modules (syntactic, semantic, phonological) as in Jackendoff (2002) and 
Culicover & Jackendoff (Culicover & Jackendoff, 2005), or maintaining 
a store of constructions as Tomasello (2003) and Goldberg (2006) urge, or 
even simply in connections between expressions (McClelland & Patterson 
(2002)) will likewise fundamentally influence what sort of learning model 
will seem appropriate.19
Additionally, the categories of rationalist and empiricist models, or 
aspects of models, are themselves very coarse grained, blurring over impor-
tant distinctions between kinds of model. Of course, the maximally simple 
imitation represented by my toy empiricist model above is woefully less 
powerful than any actual empiricist proposal in the literature. And such 
proposals will vary widely in the assumptions they make and the ways these 
assumptions guide their extrapolation from data. Any model based on 
imitation will trivially not be able to differentiate between linguistic struc-
tures which are licensed but not attested in the data from those which are 
not attested because they are illegitimate. Much of the work in empiricist 
theorizing aims precisely to account for this, and thus overcome the Poverty 
of Stimulus argument (more on this later). For example, Bayesian 
approaches (e.g., Perfors et al. (2011) and Chater et al. (2015)) are capable, 
in some circumstances, of utilizing the likelihood that a given expression- 
type would be absent from the data if it were licit to determine whether it is 
likely absent from the data as a result of a prohibition or chance (But see fn. 
27 for worries with this approach). The debate between the high-level 
categories of rationalism and empiricism thus must involve much more 
fine-grained comparison of specific rationalist and empiricist models along-
side detailed understanding of the data available to the learner and precise 
theories of the acquired competence.
Further, even if there were agreement on the actual primary linguistic 
data and the linguistic competences actually acquired on this basis, this does 
not suffice to determine the function used to map the former onto the latter. 
Empiricist and rationalist models of acquisition may agree on the observed 
cases but diverge in unobserved situations. This comes across in disputes 
about the richness of the data. When rationalists claim that some linguistic 
rule/constraint cannot be learned from the primary linguistic data, empiri-
cists often respond by showing that there is some evidence for this rule in 
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linguistic corpora.20 The issue then becomes whether such evidence is 
sufficiently frequent not only for a child exposed to these data to acquire 
the rule in question without substantive linguistic biases, but also whether it 
is frequent enough to ensure that all other speakers of the language were 
themselves exposed to analogous data, and if not whether they indeed 
acquire the rule/constraint in question. Given these uncertainties surround-
ing the input-output structure of the learning problem, disputes between 
theorists cannot take place strictly at the computational level, but will 
instead be sensitive to questions at the lower levels of algorithm and 
implementation (Marr (1982)). That is, our assumptions about what the 
inputs and outputs of the learning process would be in unobserved cases can, 
at least in principle, be guided by the differential plausibility of the mechan-
isms (algorithmic and neurobiological) needed to implement distinct com-
putational level theories which may equally provide solutions to the 
mapping problem consistent with our observations of actual language 
learners and their environment.21
As always, theory choice here must be holistic. We cannot really start with 
a model of the available data, or of the acquired competence, as a fixed point, 
and then mold our developmental theories accordingly. What is assessed is 
thus a complex of theories/models of all three domains (and more, includ-
ing neuroscience, other branches of cognitive science, evolutionary theory, 
etc.). Having noted this, I hope it will not distort the discussion too much to 
continue to assume a relatively fixed picture of the primary linguistic data 
and of the developed language faculty. The aim here of course is not to 
establish a particular developmental theory, but instead to display how such 
debates function, to show that there are no a priori answers to be had, and 
tentatively suggest that an intermediate approach, weak rationalism and 
weak empiricism, is most plausible given the current state of play.
4. An example: Bayesian grammar acquisition
Culbertson and Smolensky (2012) present a Bayesian model of acquisition 
of word order rules for a small fraction of English, consisting of just three 
basic expression types: N(ouns), Adj(ectives), and Num(eral determiners). 
The aim of the model is to determine, on the basis of some observed 
expressions, whether ‘modifiers’ (Adj and Num) are grammatical before 
or after the nouns they combine with. The grammars in question are 
probabilistic, rather than deterministic, so technically all four options 
(Adj-N, N-Adj, Num-N, N-Num) are grammatical, and what needs to be 
determined are the probabilities of each. That is, some grammars make, for 
example, Adj-N more likely than N-Adj, and the model aims to determine 
which such grammar is most likely responsible for the data it encounters.
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A grammar can, in this model, be defined as a pair of conditional prob-
abilities: pAdj: (Adj   N AdjPj ), and pNum: Num   N NumPjð Þ: these express 
the probability of the modifier preceding the noun, given that a modifier of 
this sort is present. “ Adj   N AdjPjð Þ = 1” means that adjectives always 
precede nouns, for example. The model estimates, on the basis of encounter-
ing some training data (a collection of modifier/noun pairs with an equal 
number of pairs containing Adj and containing Num, but with different 
proportions of modifiers before or after the noun), which pair of such condi-
tional probabilities is most likely to have produced these data. This is the 
grammar that is then inferred to.
Along with the training data, the priors of the system determine which 
grammar is inferred to (in line with Bayesian updating). There are two 
factors of the priors in these models:
A: A regularization bias.
B: A substantive bias.
The regularization bias is the degree to which extreme values (close to 1 
or 0) of pAdj and pNum are preferred. The regularization bias is encoded in the 
model as the shape of the prior probability distribution over grammars. This 
is given as the combination of four components. Each component corre-
sponds to a preference for an equivalence class of grammars, namely those 
that favor a particular pair of word orderings. For example, one component 
will favor a grammar which views Adj-N and Num-N orders as most likely 
(although members of this class will assign different probabilities to these 
orderings, they will all be greater than .5). The other components likewise 
favor (Adj-N, N-Num), (N-Adj, N-Num), and (N-Adj, Num-N) grammars. 
An important restriction in this model is that the degree to which these 
extreme values are favored is the same in all four components. This degree is 
given as the shape of the probability distribution each component assigns to 
its favored grammar, given as a product of two beta distributions: (αAdj, βAdj) 
representing the shape of the prior probability distribution for hypotheses 
concerning the frequency of Adj-N vs. N-Adj, (αNum, βNum) doing likewise 
for Num-N vs. N-Num. The ratio of α:β is determined by the model.
The substantive bias involves assigning weights to each component, 
increasing or decreasing the regularization in the direction of the compo-
nent’s favored grammar. This is stated as a set of four values, one for each 
equivalence class of grammars (γ1,γ2,γ3,γ4). These values always sum to 1, 
but the particular values are determined by the model.
The priors of the model are thus given by the four beta distributions, each 
imposing the same degree of regularization toward the four possible classes 
of grammars, and four component strengths, which each serve to increase or 
reduce the influence of one of these four components. Differences in the 
values of these priors influence the behavior of these systems in different 
ways:
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(1) Models with flat beta distributions (i.e., with α=β=1) do not regular-
ize, and so will adopt the grammar that precisely tracks the distribu-
tion of word orders in the training data.
(2) The more uneven the distribution (i.e., the further the ratio of α:β 
deviates from 1), the less variability in the data will be reflected by the 
selected grammar. Distributions with high α values will regularize 
toward grammars with pre-nominal modifiers, while distributions 
with high β values regularize toward grammars with post-nominal 
modifiers.
(3) The values of γ influence which equivalence class of grammar is 
favored. For example, a high γ3 increases the regularization toward 
(Num-N, N-Adj) grammars.
Model training involves running Bayesian inferences on the training data, 
for a collection of models with different priors (i.e., different regularization 
and substantive biases). Each model will select the grammar which would 
make the training data most likely. Model testing then involves introducing 
new data, and seeing which of the grammars arrived at by each model, with 
their distinct biases/priors, makes these testing data most likely. Those 
priors which resulted in the model best able to predict the training data 
are then viewed as correct. In this case, a strongly regularizing prior, biased 
toward (Adj-N, Num-N) and (N-Adj, N-Num) grammars, with low weight 
for (N-Adj, Num-N), and zero weight for (Adj-N, N-Num) maximized the 
likelihood of the training data. This distribution is in line with Greenberg’s 
Universal 18, which says that Adj-N languages are usually Num-N lan-
guages, but not conversely.
This model demonstrates the various contributions of the environment 
and the learning system I wish to classify. In the first place, this is a weakly 
empiricist model. The Bayesian response to the environmental data aims to 
extract enough information from these data to determine what was the most 
likely source of these patterns. Clearly, different environmental data lead to 
different acquired grammars, and the selected grammar reflects patterns in 
the data. However, the priors, both the substantive and regularization bias, 
contribute essentially to the selection of a grammar. The regularization bias 
means that the acquired grammar does not merely reproduce the statistical 
patterns in the environment, but instead assumes that such a pattern was 
noisily generated, and so projects a simpler rule. The substantive bias means 
that some of these simpler (regular) rules are favored over others, with the 
extreme case being (Adj-N, N-Num) toward which the model never reg-
ularizes. The extent to which the acquired grammar deviates from the 
environmental pattern, due to these priors, is thus the extent to which 
language is innate according to this model.
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It is worth noting also that the two biases, which together determine the 
shape of the priors, seem to differ with respect to how plausibly general they 
are. It is likely that some sort of noise-reduction mechanism is widespread 
in psychological learning, and so the regularization bias may plausibly be 
viewed as innate in the wider sense, but not innate with respect to language 
learning. If this were the only bias in a language acquisition model, it would 
be fair to describe language as non-innate. However, the substantive bias is 
language specific. It is stated as a preference for some word orders over 
others. It is hard to see how this could reflect a general property of inductive 
inference. For this reason, according to this model, language acquisition is, 
at least to some extent, innate in the domain-specific sense. This seems to be 
the intuitive description of this model: it is explicitly designed to capture the 
ways in which human speakers are disposed to favor certain specifically 
linguistic hypotheses over others.
While this is an impure empiricist model, it indicates what a pure model 
would look like. As I said, removing the substantive bias plausibly would 
produce a model which is, from the perspective of language, purely empiri-
cist: the developed state can be explained without any reference to language- 
specific innate influence. While we cannot remove the priors entirely, we 
could remove the bias inherent in them. This could be done by positing a flat 
distribution, removing the preference for regular grammars. Such a system 
would simply reproduce the statistical patterns in the environment: if 80% 
of the observed sentences containing adjectives were Adj-N, the system 
would infer that 80% of all adjectives preceded their nouns.22
The explanatory power of this model essentially depends on the priors it 
assigns to the learner. We can explain Greenberg’s universal 18 with refer-
ence to the substantive bias. This is in contrast with one of the often stated 
virtues of Bayesian models: that the priors don’t matter. The more explana-
tory work is done by the priors, the less is done by the Bayesian confirmation 
itself, and so it is often argued that the explanatory power of certain 
Bayesian systems does not depend at all on the priors. This is because it is 
provable that under a variety of conditions, given sufficient evidence, the 
priors wash out. That is, as the evidence increases, posteriors will become 
arbitrarily close to one another, no matter what priors they started with. 
This points to another distinction helpfully captured by my notion of 
nativism: while all Bayesian models must have priors, they only sometimes 
play an explanatory role in accounting for development. When the priors 
wash out, we do not need to make reference to them in explaining the 
developed trait, and thus can view such a trait as non-innate. However, 
when, as in the case above, the shape of the priors plays an essential 
explanatory role, the developed trait is, to that extent, innate.
As well as general worries with Bayesian models of language acquisition 
(See e.g., Yang (2017)), there are worries specific to this model. In particular, 
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it is highly restricted in scope, focusing on the acquisition only of the word 
ordering of three kinds of phrases. Of course, starting with the simpler cases 
is often a good methodology, but it is not always possible to scale up. In this 
case, one difficulty is that the tested hypotheses (the conditional probabil-
ities of modifiers preceding/following nouns) cover the entire possible 
hypothesis space: all orders, with all probabilities, are tested. One of the 
central insights of the generativist tradition is that this will not be the case in 
general for language acquisition: some linguistic hypotheses are never even 
entertained, such as hypotheses positing structure-independent rules. 
Relatedly, it is unlikely that hypotheses as specific as those in this model 
are tested. Even if there are word-order rules involved in acquiring 
a language, they are likely more general than those in the Bayesian model 
discussed. Determining which hypotheses are included and excluded will 
thus in general be a further area relevant for claims about linguistic nati-
vism. I discuss this model, despite these difficulties, just to provide 
a worked-out case in which we can clearly apply the various distinctions 
about innate and non-innate aspects of learning models. In particular, 
I hope that this model has shown that the question of whether a system is 
purely empiricist, purely nativist, or a mixed system is not a priori. Given 
a suitable definition of innateness, all of these are empirical possibilities. 
I turn now to the argument that language acquisition must in fact be mixed.
5. Against pure empiricism
The central argument for rationalism, the Poverty of Stimulus argument 
(hereafter PoS), is precisely an argument for the claim that linguistic com-
petence is innate in the sense earlier defined. The logic of a PoS involves 
determining that some aspect of a developed language faculty (e.g., con-
straints on movement) is present even when there is nothing in the envir-
onment (the stimulus) for it to reflect. Under these conditions, this extra 
structure must be provided by the organism itself, and is thus innate.
The logic of PoS is as follows23:
P1: In acquiring their native language, learners adopt hypothesis H rather 
than distinct hypothesis H’.24
P2: The evidence available does not discriminate between H and H’.
C: Therefore, a preference for H is innate.
It is usually granted that such an argument is (barring magic) valid. If the 
evidence available to the child does not discriminate between the two 
hypotheses, there must be some innate fact about the child which does. 
The case for innateness then depends on finding linguistic hypotheses that 
are acquired, but for which favorable evidence is not plausibly found in the 
environment.25
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One paradigmatic example is yes-no question formation. Consider the 
relationship between the indicative (1) and the corresponding interroga-
tive (2):
(1) Xian has gone to Panama.
(2) Has Xian gone to Panama?
English-speaking children by the age of three are uniformly able to form and 
understand questions in this way. The problem is that such examples of 
question-formation, which are plentiful in a child’s linguistic environment, 
do not settle which rule is used in question formation. For example, the rule 
“front the first auxiliary” would correctly predict this pattern.26 However, 
consider the following, more complex, sentences:
(3) Xian, who has been fired, has gone to Panama.
(4) Has Xian, who has been fired, gone to Panama?
(5) *Has Xian, who been fired, has gone to Panama?
The rule just proposed would predict that (5) would be the interrogative 
form of (3). But (5) is nonsense, as every English-learning child knows. The 
rule in question must rather be “front the matrix auxiliary”, which correctly 
predicts sentence (4). Premise 1 of the argument is thus established.
The argument is completed by showing that the evidence requisite for 
discriminating these two rules (e.g., sentence (4)) is not available to the 
language-learning child. Legate and Yang (2002) calculate that of the 20,651 
questions in the CHILDES corpus, only 14 (0.068%) are relevant to selecting 
the matrix auxiliary rule over the first auxiliary rule.27
As all children learn the correct rule, and never make mistakes like 
sentence (5), in order to deny premise 2 of the argument the evidence 
available must be robust enough that we can assume every child will 
encounter it in sufficient quantity. Such low frequency suggests that this is 
not the case for data like sentence (4).28 So, the argument concludes, because 
the child is able to select a linguistic hypothesis even if she does not have the 
requisite evidence favoring this hypothesis over others, the preference for 
hypotheses of this kind must be innate.
PoS, however, establishes only weak rationalism. Such arguments show 
that some structure for the adult language system is provided by innate 
constraints rather than abstracted from the environment. While this argu-
ment is not universally accepted, its logic is good and the kinds of cases 
discussed above, inter alia, have yet to be sufficiently addressed by the strong 
empiricist. I shall therefore assume that weak rationalism at least is correct. 
The next stage of the debate involves working out whether more can be 
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claimed for the rationalist picture. Is there reason to say that all linguistic 
competence is provided in this way?
6. The possibility of pure rationalism
Pure rationalism about language is the view that the human ability to 
acquire a language is very similar to that of R’s ability to represent 
strings.29 A small set of possible final states of the language faculty are 
circumscribed by its initial state, which also specifies which of these final 
states will result when confronted with what primary linguistic data.
The central challenge for such an approach is accounting for predictable 
linguistic variation, the apparent exemplification of patterns 2b and 2c 
above. While PoS arguments establish an important role for innate/internal 
forces in structuring the adult competence, prima facie the learner’s linguis-
tic environment plays a similar role. This accounts for the basic fact that 
ceteris paribus speakers raised in England learn to speak English, and speak-
ers raised in Japan learn to speak Japanese. That is, just as with E above, 
properties of the environment are predictable on the basis of properties of 
the developed competence. As mentioned, this is not a conclusive argument 
for empiricism, but is strong prima facie evidence for it.
A defense of pure rationalism must thus account for both linguistic 
diversity (2b) and the apparent reflection of the environment by developed 
language faculties (2c). The Principles and Parameters approach attempts to 
do just this. According to this approach, we can divide the constraints on the 
human language faculty into two types. Principles are absolute constraints 
on what languages humans can learn. During acquisition, languages violat-
ing these principles are not even considered. As well as principles there are 
parameters, which provide a range of possible options. Natural languages 
may differ in which of these options they select. The traditional picture 
views parameters as principle-schemas: providing the form of a rule that 
a language must follow, but including an open slot which must be filled to 
determine the exact content of the rule. For example, we can think of the 
Head Directionality Parameter as stating: “Heads must be –– their comple-
ments”, where ‘ –– ’ is filled in by the child, in response to linguistic 
experience, with either ‘before’ or ‘after’. By reducing language variation 
to the setting of these parameters, it is claimed that much of the apparent 
diversity is a surface-level phenomenon underlain by deep similarities.30
The pure rationalist attempt to account for the apparent reflection of the 
environment is provided by triggering models of language acquisition.31 
According to these accounts, language acquisition (especially the setting of 
parameters), involves deterministically adopting one aspect of a grammar 
on the basis of a relatively small exposure to linguistic data. For example, the 
Null-subject parameter (determining whether a sentential subject must be 
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pronounced or not) may be triggered by exposure to just one or a handful of 
sentences without pronounced subjects. The environment, according to 
such a model, is causally significant in determining the adopted grammar, 
but need not be reflected by the grammar. That is, there need not be any 
“rational” relation between the trigger and the result triggered. R, above, is 
an example of a triggering system.32
The general picture is captured nicely in Chomsky (2000, p. 8): “We can 
think of the initial state of the faculty of language as a fixed network connected 
to a switch box; the network is constituted of the principles of language, while 
the switches are the options to be determined by experience. When the 
switches are set one way, we have Swahili; when they are set another way, 
we have Japanese. Each possible human language is identified as a particular 
setting of the switches – a setting of parameters, in technical terminology. If 
the research program succeeds, we should be able literally to deduce Swahili 
from one choice of settings, Japanese from another, and so on through the 
languages that humans can acquire.”
On such a picture, human languages are more similar than they initially 
appear. They all exist within the narrow possibility space provided by 
principles, and surface variation is a result of different parameter settings. 
In particular, a small(-ish) collection of parameters may, given complex 
cascading interactions between them, result in superficially radically differ-
ent languages (see e.g., Baker (2002) for a proposal of this sort). As these 
parameter settings are triggered by, rather than extrapolated from, the 
environment, all of their structure is given by the innately specified language 
faculty. This is radically unlike the pure empiricist proposal which takes 
surface variation at face value and accounts for it by treating language 
learners as mirroring their divergent environments.
The triggering account of parameter-setting is highly controversial due, 
in large part, to the problem of ambiguous triggers.33 For many parameters, 
there are very few, if any, sentences in the primary linguistic data which 
unequivocally show how a parameter must be set. For example, differences 
in surface word-order can result from either differences in base-generation 
or in movement rules.34 This means that the learning algorithm must use 
complicated procedures to determine which stimuli are to count as triggers 
so as to avoid setting a parameter incorrectly.
Much of the work in defending triggering approaches involves providing 
some story as to how this problem is solved. The Null-subject parameter 
provides a clear example. English sets this parameter negatively, while 
Spanish sets it positively, hence the difference between *“am hungry” and 
“tengo hambre”. This parameter determines whether subjects can be 
dropped, not whether they must: “Yo tengo hambre” is perfectly gramma-
tical. English sentences, with pronounced subjects, are therefore consistent 
with both settings of this parameter. Gibson and Wexler (1994) provide 
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a solution to this problem, default parameters. For various parameters, 
unambiguous evidence is available only for one parameter setting. By 
assuming that one parameter is a default, and the other parameter will 
only be selected given unambiguous evidence for it, the problem of para-
meter setting becomes tractable. Spanish speakers, confronted with sen-
tences lacking explicit subjects will be forced to accept one setting of the 
Null-subject parameter, while English speakers will not be given such 
unambiguous evidence and will thus remain in the default, negative 
setting.35
The important thing to notice is the asymmetry between arguments for 
weak and pure rationalism. Whereas in the case for weak rationalism, the 
argument aims to show that alternative accounts are impossible, the argu-
ment for strong rationalism involves producing complex models to show 
that such an account is possible. This mirrors the difference between the 
observation of pattern 1a, which entails a contribution from the organism,36 
and that of 2b and 2c, which suggest an empiricist algorithm, but which are 
consistent with pure rationalism.
The empiricist picture is thus motivated by arguing that rationalist 
proposals, like the triggering accounts just discussed, are implausible. 
Correlation between the environment and the developed linguistic compe-
tence is, in light of these proposals, insufficient on its own. What must be 
shown is that a theory which accounts for this correlation by appealing to 
antecedently available information internal to the system is less attractive 
than one which treats this information as originally located in the environ-
ment and then reproduced in the psychology by some rational process.37 
This can involve claims that positing internal direction leads to bad predic-
tions about development (e.g., the learner is predicted to acquire a rule not 
reflected in behavior), or that such posits are explanatorily surplus (e.g., the 
mechanisms needed to extract this information are already required in some 
other aspect of the psychology).
Which way the debate about parameter settings turns out will have 
repercussions in the rationalist/empiricist debate. Triggering accounts like 
Sakas and Fodor (2012) are currently waning in popularity, compared to 
more statistical proposals like Yang (2002), but this debate is far from 
settled. However, there are phenomena that tell more decisively against 
pure rationalism.
7. Against pure rationalism: Semi-productive rules
Some linguistic generalizations are unrestricted in their application. For 
example, the rule for forming the English progressive, “add -ing”, applies 
without exception: every progressive form in English is formed in this way. 
Because these rules are so homogeneously adhered to in the environment, 
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such cases provide little discriminating evidence between the empiricist and 
the rationalist. English speakers’ developed states show no variation with 
respect to this state, and so the rationalist does not need to posit much 
internal structure to account for this phenomenon. They can also explain 
why such a phenomenon is so wide spread: it is an aspect of one of the small 
number of stable states achievable by the language faculty. The empiricists, 
on the other hand, can similarly explain this with reference to the speaker’s 
reflection of highly stable environmental patterns.
However, some rules are more restricted in their application. Consider 
dative alternation, wherein the order of the direct and indirect objects of 
transitive verbs is switched, and the direct object is marked with 
a preposition.
(6) I gave Maria the ball.
(7) I gave the ball to Maria.
Such pairs are semantically equivalent. However, this pattern is not uni-
versally applicable. There are cases where the switched (8–9) or unswitched 
(10–11) order is not available:
(8) The water gave Maria typhoid.
(9) *The water gave typhoid to Maria.
(10) *I sacrificed God a lamb.
(11) I sacrificed a lamb to God.
While almost every aspect of language acquisition remains mysterious, the 
acquisition of semi-productive rules is particularly astounding. In the case 
of the acquisition of the English progressive, a child must recognize that 
certain utterances describe ongoing events as such. However, once this is 
done, the child has a clean basis from which to induce a rule. The child can 
safely assume that verb-stems followed by ‘-ing’ are progressives. Such an 
extrapolation will not significantly mislead the child in either production or 
interpretation.38 Compare this to the case of dative alternation. The simplest 
rule, move the direct object after the indirect object and mark it with ‘to’, is 
falsified by (9) and (10). Nevertheless, the child is able to acquire mastery of 
these rules, and apply them to novel cases in much the way that adults do.39
Yang (2016) discusses a mechanism by which these complex rules are 
acquired. According to his Tolerance Principle: a rule is acquired if and only 
if e � NlnN , where e is the number of observed exceptions to the rule (i.e., 
examples to which the rule could apply, but to which it is known not to) and 
N is the number of examples to which the rule can (correctly or incorrectly) 
apply. The Tolerance Principle captures a fact about cognitive economy: 
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extracting generalizations from data is efficient to the extent that the excep-
tions are few compared to the cases to which the rule correctly applies.
A central feature of Yang’s view is the division of data into fine- 
grained categories for the application of the Tolerance Principle. Based 
simply on an unclassified natural language corpus, very few rules would 
meet the threshold required for acquisition. Yang’s clearest case of this is 
German pluralization.40 Only about 4% of german nouns found in the 
corpora pluralize with ‘-s’. Nonetheless, this rule is productive: novel and 
loan words typically pluralize with ‘-s’. How can this be if the exceptions 
to this rule ( � 96% of German nouns) vastly outnumber the good cases? 
Yang’s answer is that the class of constructions to which a rule could 
apply is not homogenous. Instead, it is divided into multiple sub-classes 
(e.g., according to gender), each of which are targets of more specific 
rules. N for each rule is not simply the number of expressions to which 
the rule could apply, but this number minus the number of expressions 
covered by other rules. In this way, Yang shows how each rule learned 
(“feminine nouns are pluralized with ‘-en’” etc.) can meet the threshold 
required by the Tolerance Constraint. “Add-s” is the most general 
(“default”) rule, in that it doesn’t place any special constraints on the 
nouns to which it applies. The fact that most nouns are already covered 
by alternative, specific, rules explains why it generalizes: of the few 
nouns not already covered by other rules, it applies with few exceptions.
Returning to our earlier example, the simplest rule for dative-alternation 
is: a double-object construction is grammatical if and only if a to-dative is 
grammatical. However, due to examples like (9) and (10), this won’t do. For 
this reason, Yang argues that speakers taxonomize the class of such con-
structions so as to find more specific constructions for which the number of 
exceptions is tolerably low. For example, if we semantically restrict the set of 
to-datives so as to include only verbs of caused possession (e.g., ‘give’, 
‘donate’ etc.), the ratio of e to NlnN drops sufficiently so as to pass under 
the bar presented by the Tolerance Principle. Similar subclassification 
according to semantics, phonology, etc. enables Yang to make accurate 
predictions about which rules will be adopted, and thus about what kinds 
of over-generalization will occur.
In this way, when acquiring rules for semi-productive phenomena, the 
model posits that speakers extrapolate linguistic rules on the basis of how 
frequently these rules are attested in their environment (relative to observed 
counter-examples). This is a clear case of an empiricist form of learning, in 
our sense. The crucial difference between this learning mechanism and 
triggering proposals is that the latter require that certain stimuli are indivi-
dually causally sufficient for a given change in the language faculty. Yang’s 
model, however, treats the faculty as responding instead to high-level 
patterns. This empiricist move allows for an explanation of when the faculty 
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does and does not induce a rule, thus accounting for differential degrees of 
productivity. For each (possible) class of constructions to which one such 
rule applies, the pure rationalist would have to posit innate structure. Given 
how fine-grained these rules are, this would put serious pressure on the 
innate endowment.
This sensitivity to environmental patterns also explains characteristic 
properties of linguistic development, such as the “U-shaped curve”: the 
phenomenon of children’s linguistic competence degrading before they 
acquire mastery. Very young speakers tend to make fewer grammatical 
mistakes than those slightly further along in development. Yang explains 
this with his Tolerance Condition. At a very young age, children are exposed 
to relatively few verbs, many of which (e.g., ‘be’, ‘have’) are irregular. This 
prevents extrapolation, and so each inflection is learned separately. As they 
acquire more verbs, and thus more regular verbs, they begin to project rules, 
and so we see characteristic over-regularizations (‘I breaked/taked the toy’). 
As more evidence becomes available, they begin the process of sub- 
categorization described above, eventuating in mastery of the rules. This 
model thus makes linguistic competence highly correlated with the specific 
evidence available, indicative of patterns 2b and 2 c above.41
I hope the preceding has provided a convincing case for an intermediate 
position between the pure forms of rationalism and empiricism. While PoS 
shows that some information in the adult linguistic competence must be 
provided by the organism itself, this should not lead one to the stronger 
claim that natural language acquisition is purely internally driven, as gen-
erativists have sometimes suggested. The acquisition of semi-regular rules is 
better explained by a model according to which the learner reflects statistical 
patterns of usage in the environment in their developed linguistic faculty. 
This is an important way in which language acquisition is not analogous to 
the development of bodily organs, as Chomsky has often suggested.42 While 
environmental differences may lead to the development of cancer in differ-
ent organisms’ livers, these effects do not reflect their environment. As 
Yang’s model shows, linguistic competence is, unlike the development of 
the liver, at least in part a rational process, involving the extraction of 
information in the environment, as the weak empiricist claims.
8. A (Surprising?) convergence
Presumably as a result of the widespread misconception that pure rational-
ism and pure empiricism are a priori false, there is a (perhaps) surprising 
convergence of views in the literature on the mixed view defended herein. 
Theorists who are strikingly different in their conceptions of what language 
is and how it is acquired all propose models in which domain specific innate 
knowledge provides the space in which empiricist models can apply.
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On the one hand, committed empiricist theorists typically model lan-
guage as hypothesis confirmation, where the hypotheses being tested are 
themselves provided innately. Following Fodor (1981, 1975), a recent man-
ifesto promoting empiricism in linguistics, Chater et al. (2015, pp. 47–48), 
accepts that language acquisition must involve searching for the right 
hypothesis in an antecedently defined search space. As Perfors (2012) says, 
“a pre-specification of a latent hypothesis space is necessary for learning.” 
(p. 134). But this pre-specified search space is itself precisely an instance of 
language-specific innate knowledge. Just as we saw in the Bayesian model 
discussed in section 4, these empiricist models build in language specific 
information, and then identify which such hypothesis is most plausible in 
light of the data.
These models thus end up looking a lot like the rationalist models they 
aim to reject. Early generative work (e.g., Chomsky (1965)) viewed language 
acquisition as precisely a matter of selecting between alternative possible 
grammars on the basis of linguistic evidence (as noted by Chater et al. (2015, 
p. 60). Recent work in this tradition has likewise suggested this model (Yang 
(2002, 2016)). The major difference, for our purposes, between these views is 
that the rationalist models in a sense posit less innate structure. A robust 
Universal Grammar consists, in these rationalist models, in the absence of 
certain linguistic hypotheses. Hypotheses describing certain logically possi-
ble languages (e.g., languages containing structure-independent rules) are 
never even entertained by language learners. So the nativist views the 
language learner as selecting within a constrained search space. But the 
structure of the problem is the same.
It is worth noting that work in the Minimalist program in contemporary 
generative theory is likewise moving in this direction. As argued by Boeckx 
(2010, 2014), building on Chomsky (2002, 2007a, 2007b, 2015), Minimalist 
motivations make plausible a distinction between the core properties of 
grammar, the innate and species-universal structure-building operations, 
and the periphery, consisting of learned and thus variable strategies of 
externalization (i.e., morphology and phonology) and the lexicon. These 
latter features of language can then be acquired in more-or-less empiricist 
ways. While this differs from classical generativist proposals in differentiat-
ing the learned from the innate as distinct components of acquired linguistic 
competence (perhaps even reserving the term ‘language’ for the former), we 
can see a deep similarity in their treatment of language acquisition and 
variation: innate and universal features of the mind limit the possible 
developed capacities while systems for extrapolating from linguistic experi-
ence account for inter-linguistic variation.
From this perspective, we can see that the major outlier here is the 
middle-period of the generative tradition, the Principles and Parameters 
model. Since the downfall of the purely empiricist behaviorism in the early 
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20th Century, only this view has seriously considered a pure approach to 
language acquisition, with parameter setting as a deterministic response to 
particular linguistic stimuli, rather than the kind of inductive approach 
characteristic of empiricist models. That this model seems to be waning in 
popularity (see fn. 30) suggests the promise of something of a consensus in 
the field, although of course this still leaves much room for disagreement.43
9. Conclusion
In this paper, I hope to have shown that pure rationalism and empiricism 
are untenable. Viable theories of linguistic development will thus need to 
account both for information provided by the environment and the organ-
ism. This position thus differs, on the one hand, from those who claim that 
pure empiricist (e.g., domain-general Bayesian) or pure rationalist (e.g., 
strictly triggering-based parametric) theories are sufficient to account for 
language acquisition, and on the other from those who claim that is is 
a priori that no pure approach will work. By spelling out the logic of the 
arguments against these strong positions, the strategy of the middle-ground 
is made clearer, as is its status as a contingent, empirical hypothesis.
Notes
1. E.g Descartes (1641/2017).
2. E.g., Locke (1836/1996).
3. E.g., the Logical Empiricists’ extension from epistemology into scientific 
methodology.
4. It is sometimes suggested that this fact does not show that innateness is not a causal 
notion. Instead, it shows that innateness is not a categorical notion. That is, that there 
are degrees of innateness: traits are more or less innate to the extent that they are 
caused by internal forces. However, as internal and external influences are always 
necessary but insufficient for developed traits, it is hard to make sense of this graded 
notion of causality.
5. The carrying of information (i.e., the reducing of possibilities) can however be used 
a a heuristic: innate traits will typically carry less information about the environment 
than non-innate traits, due precisely to the fact that the latter (function to) reproduce 
environmental patterns.
6. Although they may be. See Wexler (2003) for an argument, drawing on a very wide 
range of evidence, that certain features of a child’s innate knowledge of language is 
genetic.
7. Note that strictly, the claim is not that, for a rationalist system, the final state doesn’t 
reflect the environment, but that the system does not function to reflect the environ-
ment. Criticisms of rationalist proposals often fail due to a misunderstanding of this 
point. I will often talk simply of traits reflecting or not reflecting the environment, but 
it should always be kept in mind that what is meant is a functional claim about how 
this system develops, not merely a feature of the end-product of this development.
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8. Obviously, nothing has been said about the details of E, whether it is, say, a Bayesian 
or a frequentist system, whether it responds to higher-order regularities or not, etc. 
which would determine its response to such strings. The example is merely 
illustrative.
9. O’Neill (2015) rightly points out that this is a weaker notion than ‘canalization’ as 
introduced into the biological literature by Waddington (1942). Waddington’s notion 
of canalization was a particular kind of invariance; namely, invariance in development 
as a result of developmental feedback mechanisms, usually as a product of selection 
for such invariance. While Ariew often suggests this more complex notion, most of 
the literature on innateness (e.g., Samuels (2004) and Collins (2005)) seems instead to 
view canalization as simple invariance, as stated in the body of the text.
10. So called ‘wild children’, raised in awful conditions in which they receive minimal 
linguistic input, never seem to fully acquire a language (see Curtiss et al. (1974)). 
However, it seems that the linguistic input can apparently be relatively impoverished, 
as seen in the case of home sign (see Goldin-Meadow (2005)).
11. Note that similar results could be obtained instead by appealing to a “normal envir-
onments condition’’, according to which a trait is not innate if it develops only in 
abnormal environments, as in Samuels (2002). Such a condition faces all the usual 
worries with spelling out what it takes for an environment to be normal.
12. One difficulty in describing these debates as neutrally as possible is that empiricists 
sometimes object to using language like ‘competence’ or ‘faculty’ which at least 
suggest a specialized system. I shall continue using these terms simply to refer to 
the capacity to use and acquire a language, without presupposing the standard 
generativist account of in what such capacities consist.
13. A plausible mechanism for this would be the Baldwin effect, wherein genetic disposi-
tions to learn new behaviors are selected for. Glackin (2011) argues for an evolu-
tionary account of language in just these terms.
14. However, Christiansen and Chater (2008) argue in the opposite direction that we may 
plausibly view the rapidity with which language changes compared to the evolution of 
the human organism as requiring that it is language which adapts to the requirements 
of the speakers, and not vice versa. It is unclear what exactly to make of this proposal. 
Of course, it is agreed by all parties that language must, in order to be passed on from 
one generation to the next, be learnable, and so any “attempt’’ to modify language 
which cannot be learned by the next generation will fail. The dispute then is whether 
the features of the mind which make some languages better adapted are specific to 
language or not.
15. See e.g., Lewontin et al. (1984), Rose and Rose (2010), Buller (2006), and Lickliter and 
Honeycutt (2003).
16. Note that pure empiricism is not the claim that no properties of the organism matter 
for explaining the developed state. This position is indeed a priori false. How the 
organism responds to its environment will of course depend on what the organism is 
like. A pure empiricist system will have some structural properties which explain why 
it responds to the environment in a purely empiricist way, namely some develop-
mental system (e.g., a learning algorithm) which functions to precisely reproduce the 
environmental patterns it encounters.
17. Those objecting to the perceived excesses of generative grammar tend to adopt 
a position something like this Goldberg (2006), Tomasello (2003), and Onnis et al. 
(2008)).
18. Hale and Reiss (2008) argue for an analogous view of phonology.
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19. I am here assuming that debates about the purview of linguistics (e.g., whether 
linguistics is, following Chomsky, a science of the mind, or like Katz (1980) 
a formal theory of Platonic abstracta, or extra-mental concrete reality as in Devitt 
(2006)) do not arise in developmental linguistics. A theory of language acquisition 
must be a psychological theory, on pain of changing the subject. Of course, however, 
one’s views about linguistic theory may influence one’s theory of acquisition.
20. E.g., Sampson (1989) and Pullum and Scholz (2002).
21. Note that I am here assuming that both the rationalist and the empiricist models are 
themselves computational level models. On the first point, there is wide agreement. 
However, it is sometimes suggested that many paradigm empiricist models, especially 
Bayesian approaches, are best understood as algorithmic models. I am here following 
some of the leading voices in Bayesian cognitive science in insisting that they be 
viewed, just like their rationalist opposite numbers, as computational (Chater et al. 
(2011)).
22. But see Van Dongen (2006) for worries that the appeal to flat priors itself hides 
substantive assumptions which themselves influence the end result in often surprising 
ways. While van Dongen’s point is well taken, his advice on how to avoid bias in 
Bayesian modeling seems more difficult to adopt. Firstly, he proposes that a certain 
amount of prior knowledge should be allowed in the selection of priors. This is fine 
advice in many cases, but doesn’t apply to debates concerning nativism, where the 
shape of the priors may be exactly what is at issue. So, while his point is a sound one, 
the “uninformative priors approach’’ may be plausible in this case, even though it is 
not applicable across the board.
23. See Crain and Pietroski (2001) for an excellent overview.
24. I am assuming here a model according to which language acquisition is profitably 
described as the acquisition of hypotheses (alternatively, rules or constraints, which 
I will use interchangeably). This has itself been challenged (see McClelland and 
Patterson (2002)).
25. As in my above account of reflecting the environment, it is worth distinguishing the 
functioning of the system from the actual relationship between the system and the 
environment. In this case, what matters is whether the learner uses or relies on the 
available evidence to acquire H over H’. If not, H is innate, even if there is (unused) 
evidence available in the environment. The absence of such evidence from the 
environment is, of course, the best possible reason for claiming that learners are not 
using this evidence.
26. I am sidestepping the question of how these abstract classifications (like ‘auxiliary’ 
and ‘matrix’) are themselves acquired by the learner, although this is itself part of 
a powerful argument for nativism.
27. This is an oversimplification. Crucially, it is highly contentious whether only positive 
evidence of this sort should be included in the data set from which learners generalize. 
In particular, Bayesian models, such as Perfors et al. (2010), often stress that the 
absence of certain constructions from the learner’s experience can itself function as 
evidence that such constructions are not possible. There are, however, significant 
problems with this kind of argument. See, in particular, Marcus (1993) and Yang 
(2015) for compelling empirical arguments that any system capable of excluding 
possible expressions on the basis of indirect negative evidence is liable to massively 
overgenerate and exclude many perfectly acceptable expressions. This problem is 
exacerbated in cases where the child’s language environment is very sparse, as in cases 
of deaf children with non-signing parents (Goldin-Meadow and Yang (2017)). As 
mentioned above, the poverty of the linguistic data has itself been challenged by e.g., 
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Reali and Christiansen (2005). Gulordava et al. (2018) develop computational models 
for the acquisition of hierarchical structure from a naturalistic corpus. See Yang et al. 
(2017) for critical discussion of these kinds of model.
28. Various features of language acquisition can be used to strengthen this claim. For 
example, children must not only be exposed to these crucial data, they must also 
attend to them. As young children have been shown to be fairly weak at parsing 
complex sentences, it is not a given that even if they encounter sentences like 4 they 
will use them as evidence for or against their linguistic hypotheses.
29. Perhaps even R is slightly impure in that the letter which gets represented as output is 
always found in the input, as the first letter of the string. R was described this way for 
clarity, but even this reflection of the environment could be dropped. Say instead that 
R’s behavior was modeled by a set of 26 rules of the form: “if the first character of the 
input is ‘a’, output ‘bbbb . . . ’ ”, “if the first character is ‘b’, output ‘kkkk . . . ’ ”, and so 
on for all 26 classes of possible inputs.
30. This picture of parameters is somewhat out of date. Contemporary generative theory 
largely either views parametric variation as restricted to differences in the lexicon as in 
Borer (2014), or rejects the idea of parameters, in this sense, entirely, as in Boeckx 
(2010). This debate is highly complex, and so I will skip the details, but note that if 
a pure rationalism is to be maintained, something like parameters, accounting for 
linguistic variation, is necessary. It is for this reason that Boeckx advocates for a mixed 
approach, with an innate (rationalist) core, and variation accounted for by abstracting 
rules from the environment.
31. See e.g., Sakas (2016) for a recent overview.
32. Fodor (1975)’s position that (almost) all concepts must be innate can be understood 
analogously. Because there is no (known) procedure by which we can learn, i.e., 
rationally acquire, the information stored in our concepts, this information must 
come from within the system. Environmental stimuli can thus serve to trigger the 
occurrence or development of a concept, but the environment is limited to this causal 
role, rather than the traditional role as the source of this information.
33. I am here focusing on internal debates about how to develop a parametric model, for 
which this problem is one of the most severe. Those who reject the parametric view 
entirely are often motivated by precisely the observations about language that 
I mentioned as favoring empiricist models: that languages display high degrees of 
variation, and these variations correlate with environmental patterns. The rejection of 
so-called “micro-parameters”, purported parameters which correspond to these very 
fine-grained differences, is largely motivated in this way. See Newmeyer (2005) for 
discussion.
34. E.g., A sentence which seems to be SVO can either be a result of a genuinely (under-
lying) SVO language (such as English), or an underlying SOV language with a rule 
that moves verbs into second position in surface form (such as German). There are 
complex empirical issues in this area. For example, if Kayne (1994) is right, then all 
languages are SVO in their underlying structure. This would have important reper-
cussions for a triggering account of language acquisition, as it may make the problem 
of ambiguous triggers easier to solve.
35. Other complications to the triggering model, such as the distinction between “global’’ 
and “local’’ triggers, i.e., triggers which unambiguously require a particular parameter 
setting no matter what other parameter settings are selected versus those which 
unambiguously call for a particular setting only given other settings, can be intro-
duced in order to solve these kinds of issues. See Sakas and Fodor (2012) for 
a thorough proposal along these lines.
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36. Although it is an empirical question whether the contribution is language-specific or 
not, i.e., whether language is innate in the narrow, domain-specific sense or not.
37. This fact explains something puzzling about the terminological conventions in this 
debate: it is the empiricists who are committed to the explanation of language acquisi-
tion as a rational activity, whereas rationalists view this process as purely causal.
38. I am skimming over significant complications in the story here. These complications 
should not matter for our purposes.
39. An additional complication in this debate is how we ought apportion this linguistic 
competence to the learner’s psychological system. In particular, it may be that semi- 
productive rules are not acquired in the same way, i.e., by the development of the 
same psychological system, as the kinds of generally applicable principles and (pos-
sibly) parameters discussed in previous sections. A picture of this sort is suggested in 
Dupre (2019). However, I take it that an account of language acquisition in general 
must account for all kinds of acquisition, whether this involves the development of 
just one specifically linguistic system or many. More on this issue in section 8.
40. Yang (2016) Chapter 4.
41. An extra benefit is that such a proposal provides a neat explanation for historical language 
change. When, for whatever reason, the patterns in the environment are modified (say by 
the influx of speakers of different languages as a result of mass immigration), the children 
will pick up on, and reflect, such patterns. It is much more difficult to give a triggering- 
based account of this phenomenon. See Yang (2000) for discussion.
42. See, for example, Chomsky (2000) (p. 5).
43. An interesting possibility, however, would be that this mixed approach can itself 
resolve some of the issues with the Principles and Parameters approach. In particular, 
this approach seemed to flounder because inter-linguistic variation seemed to be too 
fine-grained, leading to the positing of too many micro-parameters, and too sensitive 
to the environment, as we saw in the discussion of semi-productive rules. If some of 
this variation and sensitivity can be viewed as acquired separately by empiricist-style 
models, it could be possible to revise such a picture and avoid these problems. On 
such a view, language variation reflects two distinct modes of language acquisition: 
parameter setting and learning. Of course, this would still fail to be a pure rationalist 
model. This would perhaps be a slightly messier model than those discussed in the 
text, but who expected cognitive science to be clean?
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